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......h the authors of this page or responsible for its content. S-R Central Asia Layout Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? February 2004 Jacquelyn K. Davis Michael J. Sweeney A publication of The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
1725 DeSales Street, NW, Suite 402
Washington, D.C. 20036
202-463-7942 i The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? Table of Contents Executive Summary................................................................................................................... i Chapter I: Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1 Chapter II: Defining Central Asia ............................................................................................. 5 Chapter III: Partnership with Stalins Heirs....................................................................... 15 Chapter IV: Central Asia as a Front in the War of Ideas .................................................... 29 Chapter V: The Smuggling of Illicit Materials ....................................................................... 41 Chapter VI: U.S. Presence in Central Asia:
Meshing Policy and Operational Requirements.................................................. 47 Chapter VII: Regional Perspectives on U.S. Presence in Central Asia .................................. 63 Chapter VIII: Final Thoughts and Recommendations............................................................ 77 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis i The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis In the aftermath of the September 11 th attacks, the United States intensifi ed its relations with a number of Central Asian states. This region had long been regarded as Russias backyard,
but with the demise of Soviet/Russian power and in the face of the evident need to confront the
Taliban for its support of the Al Qaeda terrorist network, U.S. interests and military-operational
priorities dictated the need to deepen U.S. involvement with Central Asia, to include the
establishment of bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Since the autumn of 2001, U.S. policy
towards this potentially volatile region of the world has been more ad hoc than well-reasoned in
terms of future implications for U.S. strategic interests. This must change if the United States is
to avoid getting itself enmeshed in another Iran-like situation. In reconceptualizing our approach to Central Asia, the United States must adhere to two
strategic imperatives. First, it must continue to delineate and separate Central Asia from the
Caucasus. Forcing a tight linkage between the Caucasus and Central Asia is limiting in that it
discourages more creative thought about how each of these areas of the world relates to more
natural neighboring connections specifi cally, the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia in the
case of Central Asia. For its part, the Caucasus itself is perhaps more aptly seen as a broader
element of the Black Sea littoral zone and as the end of Europe, rather than as an adjunct of
Asia or as a riparian of the Caspian Sea. Second, and related, the United States must continue to move beyond the view of the Caspian as a
focal point for security in Eurasia. The Caspians hydrocarbon reserves are important to world
energy markets, but they are not revolutionary; more to the point, they will not come even close Executive Summary Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? ii The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis iii The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? to obviating continued reliance on the Persian Gulf as the primary oil and gas producing region of
the world. The Caspian should thus not be considered the linchpin of U.S. strategy towards either
the Caucasus or Central Asia. Indeed, to the extent that energy issues enter into debates over
policy options, it should be in the context of discussions as to how energy wealth can be used to
stabilize the weak states along the Caspian littoral and inhibit the declines in living standards
that provide fertile recruiting grounds for radical Islam and other extremist ideologies. The focus commanded by the Caspian diverted attention away from more worrisome trends in
Central Asia. All five of the former Soviet Central Asian states are deeply corrupt regimes, with
each president running his own extensive personal patronage network. This has resulted in a
growing chasm between haves and have nots; while those closest to the Central Asian
leaders have accumulated enormous wealth, average Central Asians have seen their standard of
living decline in almost every manner imaginable since the collapse of Soviet control. From basic
sanitation to quality of health care, the Central Asian states have experienced precipitous and
worrisome regression over the past decade. Perhaps most disturbing of all, literacy rates and the
overall quality of education in Central Asia has declined steadily since 1991. The people of Central Asia have suffered the societal breakdown and economic adversity seen
in many other post-communist countries, but with little prospect for improvement in the long
run. Meanwhile, their governments have increasingly relied on repressive security measures,
controls on and intimidation of the press, and rule by presidential fiat. The combination of
economic hardship and political repression provides ample breeding grounds for extremist
Islamic movements. The two most prominent extremist groups Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (HTI) and the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) have both focused their activities primarily against the regime
of Uzbek President Islam Karimov. This places the United States in the uncomfortably familiar
position of its principal military ally in a Muslim region being a corrupt, secular authoritarian
opposed by Islamic fundamentalist forces. Operation Enduring Freedom is believed to have severely weakened the IMU, destroying much of its training infrastructure and weapons stocks
and, perhaps most significantly, killing its charismatic military leader, Djuma Namangani. Still,
many Uzbek officials worry about an IMU resurgence and point out that the movements spiritual
and political leader, Tohir Yuldeshev, remains at large in the Afghan-Pakistani border regions. Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? ii The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis iii The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? The HTI, meanwhile, professes to employ only non-violent means in the pursuit of its objective:
establishment of an Islamic caliphate in Central Asia in which sharia law prevails. Although there is no evidence that the HTI has eschewed its non-violent nature, the movement is
nonetheless worrying given its avowed goal, as well as its strident anti-Americanism; HTI
propaganda portrays the United States as the leading force in a Western campaign to undermine
and destroy Islam. A basic question for Central Asian security is whether the HTI or more accurately those
individuals and groups that currently adhere to its ideology are willing to remain non-violent
indefinitely. Further radicalization and militarization of Islamist movements within Central Asia
would only deepen the strategic conundrum Washington already confronts: partnership with
regimes needed for base access to combat terrorism diminishes perceptions of the United States
as a liberal-minded and benevolent superpower, potentially lending credence to Islamic extremist
characterizations of the United States as a cynical, self-serving power. Mounting anti-American sentiments also point to the need to reconsider current U.S. public
diplomacy efforts (or lack thereof) towards Central Asia. In recent months, senior administration
officials have launched a concerted effort to call openly for real democratic reforms in the Middle
East, including in states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia that heretofore had been exempt from
criticism due to their strategic relationships with the United States. Increased calls for political
liberalization in the Middle East are, in part, a manifestation of the administrations campaign
to win the so-called war of ideas, a crucial component of the war on terror. Part and parcel
of the administrations approach to the war of ideas is a public diplomacy strategy aimed at
countering the perception of a United States indifferent to the political and economic hardships
of everyday citizens in the Arab and Muslim worlds. This new tack in policy raises questions with regard to the U.S. approach in Central Asia. It can
easily (if somewhat simplistically) be argued that we are callously repeating our errors in Central
Asia at the very moment we are attempting to correct past indiscretions in the Middle East.
Although the United States has pumped significant economic and security assistance into Central
Asia, everyday Central Asians are more likely to perceive these funds as pay-offs, propping up
regional autocrats in exchange for military access. If the United States is serious about fighting Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? iv The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis v The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? the war of ideas on all fronts, a more concerted public diplomacy campaign is needed to engage
and persuade the peoples of Central Asia. The United States must also be willing to step up behind-the-scenes pressure on our partners
in Central Asia to effect real political and economic change. This is particularly needed in
Uzbekistan, a country in which the United States invested nearly half a billion dollars in the
eleven months following the deployment of U.S. forces on Uzbek soil. The Uzbek government has
committed itself, in a five-point strategic partnership agreement signed in Washington in March
2002, to pursuing serious democratic and economic reforms. In practice, though, Uzbekistan
has offered only token gestures toward these ends. The United States needs to do a better job of
holding Karimovs feet to the fire on the pursuit of genuine economic and political reform. Aside
from the current regime tarring the United States by association, a truly democratic, stable
Uzbekistan or at least an Uzbekistan with strong, functional rule-of-law structures would be
an effective and important partner in providing for the long-term stability of Inner Asia. A strong case can be made that diversifying U.S. presence among other Central Asian states
could increase U.S. flexibility (operationally and diplomatically) while affording greater
leverage to encourage constructive changes by Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan is an interesting option
as an alternate partner, as its economic and political assets make it the Central Asian country
with the best prospect for establishing something close to a rule-of-law state in the mid term.
Admittedly, vibrant, functional democracy in Kazakhstan might be some time off, but a quasi-
free oligarchy similar to Putins Russia might be within its grasp and, for Central Asia, this
would be a marked improvement. In recommending a diversification of posture in Central Asia, the intent is not to call for a
massive build up of new facilities. With another round of Base Realignment and Closing
(BRAC) looming on the U.S. domestic horizon, there is little political appetite for attempting
to justify vast construction costs at new overseas facilities. However, in the context of current
planning in the Department of Defense (DoD) for the realignment of the U.S. global military
posture, large main bases are being de-emphasized as a priority. Rather, the focus is on less
permanent facilities, pre-positioning of equipment, and even on so-called warm areas, where
the United States only deploys periodically but maintains skeleton infrastructure. Though Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? iv The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis v The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? the nomenclature within the Pentagon is still developing, the terms forward operating bases
(FOBs) and forward operating locations (FOLs) are most commonly associated with the
notion of more austere, scaled down, semi-permanent bases. The FOBs would entail limited,
fixed infrastructure and semi-permanent deployments of troops, unaccompanied by dependents;
the FOLs would be the warm areas that would only be occupied intermittently. Using this
new parlance, our recommendation for Central Asia is to establish at least one alternate FOB in
Kazakhstan, at the most suitable of the three airfields where we now have emergency landing
privileges Almaty, Chimkent, or Lugovoi. The other two sites should become FOLs, and there
should also be a deliberate effort to establish one or more FOLs in Tajikistan. As it undertakes to revamp its posture in Central Asia, the United States will also need to
reassess the priorities attached to its military deployments, including those first undertaken
in the immediate aftermath of the September 11th attacks. While developments in Afghanistan
and Iraq including the success or failure of NATO to assume a greater burden for peacekeeping
missions beyond the Kabul area ultimately will dictate the extent to which U.S. forces can be
diverted to other missions beyond those related to stability operations and the pursuit of senior
Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders, in time, the United States could reap important benefits from
directing national resources against the Central and South Asian drug trade. Not only would
doing so undercut an essential revenue source for extremist organizations, but the monitoring
and disruption of narcotics trafficking networks also might benefit efforts to interdict transfers
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) through the Asian interior, possibly preventing terrorist
groups from obtaining and employing these weapons. These taskings also argue for at least
exploring whether facilities in Tajikistan might be a desireable addition to the U.S. Central
Asian footprint, given Tajikistans prominent role in drug trafficking through the region. We agree that the United States must maintain a presence in Central Asia for the indefinite
future, but it also should never allow itself to be held hostage by any one state or facility. It is
worth remembering that while Central Asian facilities were important to the conduct of Operation
Enduring Freedom, access through Pakistan was essential. Partnership with Pakistan, of
course, presents its own set of problems, as the attempts on President Pervez Musharrafs life in
December 2003 illustrate. If Pakistan were to suffer a coup or revolution that ended our access Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? vi The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis vii The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? to its facilities, there would be few good options available for replacing them. Central Asian
facilities would have limited utility in making up for the loss, at least in the context of pursuing
terrorists in the Pakistani-Afghan border region. The United States needs to consider other
alternatives and that dictates seriously examining options in India, as well as further developing
the concept of sea-basing with an eye towards its applicability to future scenarios in South Asia
and elsewhere along the Indian Ocean littoral. A sound U.S. Strategy towards Central Asia On the basis of the analysis contained in this study, it is possible to lay out specific steps and
policy choices that the United States should consider with respect to its strategy towards Central
Asia. We hope that they will serve as a point of departure for further debate among the policy
community on the direction and nature of U.S. strategy towards Central Asia. Continue to support development of nationally oriented civil society in Central Asia. The
development of strong, functional, secular political organizations in Central Asia remains a
primary challenge for ensuring long-term stability in this region. The United States should
continue to support grassroots efforts focused on human rights defense and other issues
which may eventually resonate with public opinion and which, over time, could provide the
basis for cohesive political movements capable of acting as a functional opposition to the
ruling regime in states like Uzbekistan. Begin establishing closer security links with Kazakhstan. While we should not rush to
christen Kazakhstan as the Georgia of Central Asia, it nonetheless appears to have the best
prospects for political and economic development over the long term. President Nursultan
Nazarbayev and his inner circle remain a real impediment to change, but movements such
as the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (PCK) and Ak Zhol constitute the brightest (albeit imperfect) hopes for a functional opposition to a Central Asian government. Give Uzbekistan a January 2006 deadline to demonstrate real progress on economic and
political reform. Convey privately to the Uzbek leadership that if it is to remain an important
regional partner of the United States, it has to show real commitment and not simply token
gestures to the establishment of a functional, rule-of-law state. If substantive steps in this Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? vi The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis vii The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? direction are not forthcoming in the next twenty-four months, the United States should be
prepared to leave Kharshi-Khanabad by the end of 2005 and redeploy its forces either in
Kazakhstan or at another facility in the region that makes best operational sense depending
on the situations in Afghanistan and Pakistan at that time. Consider options for responding proactively in the event of opportunities for change in
Turkmenistan. Given his physical ailments and Orwellian regime, it is easy to postulate that
Turkmen President Supramurat Niyazov may depart the scene suddenly, through natural
or other causes. In this event, there might be a short window for the United States and the
international community to act to support a normalization of life for the Turkmen people and
to support a reconstruction of Turkmen institutions along rule-of-law lines. We should begin
considering our response now, as the turmoil surrounding the Turkmen despots departure
also could create opportunities for unwanted outcomes such as the rise of a younger
dictator or unwelcome meddling by Tehran or Moscow. Apply U.S. national resources towards the interdiction of the drug trade in Central and
South Asia. The United States needs to begin implementing the three-pronged approach to
counter-drug policy in Central and South Asia that it has adopted in Latin America. That is,
military interdiction efforts need to be combined with promotion of alternate cash crops and
with the development of effective local law enforcement capabilities. Such an effort has the
potential, in the near term, to be resource intensive. This is why, as well, the United States
needs to attract international support for this objective, calling upon the G-8 nations and its
allies in the war on terror to participate in a comprehensive Central Asian counter-drug effort.
Considering the vital role the opiate trade plays in funding extremist terrorist organizations,
greater application of U.S. military force (and other instruments of national power) to this
task will be a sound investment. Identify Central Asia as a priority area for the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
With its robust smuggling networks, Central Asia is an ideal conduit for transfers of WMD-
related components and technologies. As the United States and its partners continue to work
towards operationalizing the PSI, Central Asia therefore needs to be identified as a priority
area for internationally coordinated counter-proliferation efforts. Advanced U.S. intelligence, Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? viii The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis ix The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets need to be programmed for long-term use in
Central Asia to assist in this endeavor (as well as to support counter-drug operations). Transform the U.S. footprint formula in Central Asia. Overall, the combination of
white SOF units working with regional militaries on counter-drug efforts coupled with the
application of U.S. ISR assets to tasks related to narcotics/proliferation interdiction points to
a scaled-down U.S. presence in Central Asia, less focused on combat forces and based more
on small-footprint assets at opposite ends of the technological spectrum. This combination
can maximize the U.S. contribution to regional security while limiting both the number of
forces and the amount of infrastructure we require. Incorporate Central Asia directly into public diplomacy statements on democracy in the
Muslim world. U.S. silence on democracy in Central Asia stands in obvious contrast to the
administrations new approach towards the Middle East. Central Asia should receive equal
billing in subsequent statements by senior administration officials on the need for political
change in key states of the Muslim world. Be willing to accept Chinese and Russian interests in Central Asia so long as they do not
impede core objectives in the war against terrorism. The United States should not allow
itself to fall into the trap of viewing involvement in Central Asia through either a Cold War
paradigm or Great Game construct that encourages a zero-sum interpretation of geopolitical
developments. Both China and Russia have their own interests in seeing this region stabilized
and in supporting the defeat of Islamic extremism. There might be diplomatic benefits (in
Central Asia itself and on other regional and global issues) to engaging Moscow and Beijing
more actively in Central Asia. Joint exercises between NATO/U.S. forces and Russian units
stationed in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan could be one avenue for exploring cooperation; the
Shanghai Cooperation Organizations proposed anti-terrorism center in Tashkent might be
another vehicle for promoting collaborative efforts. Look to India as a long-term partner in both South and Central Asia. While continuing to
buttress the current Pakistani regime to the extent feasible, the United States should proceed
with deepening its security relationship with India, up to and including the establishment Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? viii The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis ix The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? of austere, semi-permanent bases (FOLs) as a hedging step against the potential loss of
Pakistani basing infrastructure. Leverage the potential of robust sea-basing to support U.S. strategic and operational
objectives. For much of the arc of instability and with respect to prosecuting the war on
terror, the evolving sea-basing concept is projected to provide the United States with a means
to access combat regions when forward basing is not available or when political constraints
on U.S. access have been put in place by host nations. Sea-basing is not a panacea, but it is
an option that we should develop as a national strategic asset. 1 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 1 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis In René Groussets seminal work, The Empire of the Steppes, he notes that Central Asias history has been defi ned by the interconnectedness of its peripheries; as one new people pushed into the
Asian heartland be they Persians, Turks, Arabs, Mongols, Chinese, or Russians another was
displaced. This, in turn, led to new clashes as the disrupted population inevitably imposed on the
territory of others. Thus, when the Persians or Arabs entered from the West, the forebears of the
Kazakhs, Uzbeks, and Mongols pressed on the Chinese; during periods of Chinese expansion, the
inverse was true. In short, what happened in one part of Central Asia inevitably had a cascading
effect across the plains and steppes of Inner Asia. 1 As Central Asias new power and whether it was intentional or not that is increasingly the
United States status in the region the lessons espoused by Grousset in chronicling the people
of the steppe who lived and died long before the age of Genghis Khan are far more valuable than
the oft-hyped comparisons to the British-Russian Great Game at the end of the nineteenth
century. For the United States, the question at least for the moment is not whether it wields
decisive power in Central Asia. The speed with which the Taliban was dispatched made plain
that the United States is the preeminent military and political power, and, at least for the near-
term future, there is no true competition for regional primacy. Rather, at issue is how the United
States chooses to use its infl uence and how its presence in the region impacts 1) the states of
Central Asia themselves, 2) the group of strategically important states that ring the region, and
3) the broader international Muslim community that is inextricably linked to both Central Asia
and the U.S. presence therein. 1 René Grousset, The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia, Translated from the French by Naomi Walford, (New Brunswick and London: Rutgers University Press, 2000) 687 pp. Chapter I: Introduction Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? 2 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 3 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? In the two years since Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan opened their bases (and Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan opened their skies for overflight), the United States has essentially
employed a band aid approach to both its military posture on the ground in Central Asia and its
strategy towards the region more broadly. Such an ad hoc approach was both understandable and
necessary in the wake of the stunning events of September 2001. Operation Enduring Freedom produced important initial successes in the war against terrorism by ousting the Taliban and
dealing significant blows to the leadership and infrastructure of both Al Qaeda and the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Nonetheless, it is increasingly apparent that a prolonged U.S.
military presence will be required in Central Asia, even with the transition to NATO leadership
of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Alliance assumption of a broader set
of missions. At some level, U.S. troops will likely still be on the ground in Afghanistan itself and
in supporting bases in Pakistan and the Central Asian states for at least the next few years to
support stability and to continue the pursuit of Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders. Ad hoc arrangements should therefore be reconsidered and a long-term plan developed for U.S.
involvement in Central Asia, one that supports both military operational requirements in Central
Asia and broader diplomatic strategy towards the region and its immediate neighbors. This
monograph, undertaken with the generous support of the Smith Richardson Foundation, is an
independent effort by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) to enunciate the outlines
of such a strategy and to explore those principal political and military factors that need to be
taken into account while developing a plan for long-term U.S. involvement in Central Asia. It is
intended that this study will serve as a point of departure for stimulating further debate both
inside government and among the private-sector community of academic and think tank experts
on Central Asia on the specific steps the United States should take with respect to its military
posture in the region and its relations with specific Central Asian states. Now is a particularly propitious time to undertake such a discussion. First, as we pass further into
the second decade since the Soviet Unions demise, Central Asia is a region in flux. Differentiation
among the five former Soviet Central Asia republics is increasing, as are the extent of their ties
to states beyond the former Soviet Union (FSU). This ancient land is reasserting its importance
as a pivotal region of the world, having survived the better part of seven decades as a strategic Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? 2 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 3 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? backwater under Soviet rule. The changes and shifts taking place within the Central Asian
states are strategically significant, even if (more often than not) they are for the worse. Second, the United States is itself in the process of transforming and realigning its global force
posture to adapt to the new challenges posed by global terrorism and the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD). Slowly, the United States is planning the redistribution of its forces
away from the obsolete East-West pattern of confrontation to meet the new threats of the so-
called arc of instability running roughly from the Andean mountains of the Western hemisphere,
through sub-Saharan Africa, into the Middle East and Central Asia and concluding in Southeast
Asia. The final details of the proposed base restructuring have yet to be publicly released in full.
However, those elements of the realignment strategy such as plans to withdraw U.S. forces
back from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in Korea that have been disclosed indicate major
changes are in the offing. 2 Central Asian facilities could play an important role in redeploying U.S. forces to meet terrorist and WMD threats, not only in Central Asia itself, but as part of a
broader global security network. 2 Vernon Loeb, New Bases Reflect Shift in Military: Smaller Facilities Sought for Quick Strikes, Washington Post, June 9, 2003, p. A01. Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? 4 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 5 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Subsequent chapters examine current and potential security challenges in Central Asia; the
U.S. footprint in the region and hypothetical options for expanding or contracting U.S. military
presence; the benefits and limitations of each of the five Central Asian states as military partners
for the United States; and the impact of U.S. regional presence on the strategies and interests of
key neighboring states, such as China, India, and Russia. For each chapter, we provide insights
into how specific factors or trends in Central Asia should affect U.S. thinking and strategy
towards the region. The final chapter ties together our analyses of the myriad elements at work
in the Central Asian security equation and proposes specific recommendations for crafting U.S.
strategy towards Central Asia for the mid to long term, to include how best to structure our
military forces within the region. In addition to extensive archival research, this project was informed by interviews conducted
during June of 2003 in Tashkent, with senior officials from the Uzbek Ministries of Defense
and Foreign Affairs and scholars at Uzbekistans Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies
(ISRS), among others. As well, a strategy brainstorming session was convened shortly after
this research effort began, featuring keynote remarks by Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski. That session,
held on March 26, 2003 in Washington, DC, examined the overall situation in Central Asia and
the potential parameters of a coherent and effective U.S. policy towards the region. A small
group of independent scholars were invited to participate in the roundtable discussion, as were
select officials from the intelligence community, the State Department, and the Joint Staff.
The insights raised during this brainstorming session were an important springboard for this
project; however, the views expressed in this study are those of the authors alone and should
not necessarily be construed as being shared by any of the public or private sector attendees at
the March 26 th event. Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? 4 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 5 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis A necessary fi rst step towards crafting a more effective long-term U.S. strategy towards Central
Asia is to distinguish the region defi ned as the fi ve former Soviet Central Asian republics from
the broader concept of Eurasia, a blanket term employed by the U.S. government since the end
of the Cold War to describe U.S. involvement in two distinct regions of the world the Caucasus
and Central Asia. Connections certainly exist between these two regions and, on the specifi c
issue of military basing, the air corridor through the Caucasus (and especially Georgia) has clear
relevance to the sustainment of forces at land bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan (as well as in
Afghanistan itself). But forcing a tight linkage between the Caucasus and Central Asia is, from
our perspective, limiting in that it discourages more creative thought about how each of these
areas of the world relates to more natural neighboring connections specifi cally, the Middle
East, South Asia, and East Asia in the case of Central Asia. For its part, the Caucasus itself is
perhaps more aptly seen as a broader element of the Black Sea littoral zone and as the end of
Europe, rather than as an adjunct of Asia or as a riparian of the Caspian Sea, the designation with
which it has primarily been identifi ed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. 3 That the Caucasus has been mainly linked with the Caspian and not the Black Sea is largely a
by-product of the energy industrys effort to promote the Caspians hydrocarbon reserves as the
dominant factor in shaping U.S. and other international engagement with the states of Eurasia.
As discussed below, the energy potential of the Caspian has in large measure been exaggerated, 3 Particularly in terms of efforts to promote long-term stability and democracy in the Caucasus, that regions linkages to Turkey, the Balkans,
NATO, and the European Union are far more relevant than its connection to Central Asia or even the Middle East, although with respect to the
latter, there may be interest in how the Caucasus can be employed to bring pressure to bear on certain Middle Eastern states, such as Iran. Chapter II: Defi ning Central Asia Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? 6 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 7 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? a phenomenon that helped to give energy and
pipeline issues unnecessary predominance in U.S.
relations with some states in both the Caucasus
and Central Asia. More broadly, the worlds early
fi xation on the Caspians potential to trump the
strategic importance of the Persian Gulf helped
to obscure the more unsettling domestic security
trends at work in Central Asia. From Energy to Security Even before the attacks of September 11 th , there was some understanding among military planners
that Eurasia would be a priority in the twenty-
fi rst century security environment. 4 Still, much of this focus was again driven by the regions energy promise and the tendency to examine Eurasia
was in part motivated by the need to fi nd a geographic designation encompassing both sides of
the Caspian, as the inland sea was viewed as the primary fulcrum around which regional security
dynamics would pivot. The terrorist strikes against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon
helped to cement the dawning realization among many analysts that the Caspian Basin was not
the alpha and omega of Eurasias security relevancy. The prominent role played by Uzbekistan a state marginal to considerations of Caspian energy
wealth in the wake of September 11 th underscored the shift eastward in the focal point of Eurasian security dynamics. More importantly, the attacks drew increased attention to the
dangers inherent in the regions long-term susceptibility to Islamic fundamentalist movements
and the potential for one or more of the Central Asian states to succumb to fragmentation or
failure and become the next Afghanistan. With President Bushs inclusion of the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan in the same breath as Al Qaeda during his historic address to Congress 4 In 2000, the Joint Staff commissioned a net assessment of Central Eurasia undertaken jointly by the Atlantic Council of the United States
and the Central Asia and Caucasus Institute (CACI) at Johns Hopkins University: Charles Fairbanks, C. Richard Nelson, S. Frederick Starr, and
Kenneth Weisbrode, Strategic Assessment of Central Eurasia, (Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council of the United States and the Central Asia and Caucasus Institute, January 2001), 131 pp., www.acus.org/Publications/Default.htm. More recently, the U.S. Army commissioned a similar
study by RAND: Faultlines of Confl ict in the Caucasus and Central Asia: Implications for the U.S. Army, Olga Olikar and Thomas Szayna, eds., (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 407 pp., www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1598/index.html.



Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? 6 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 7 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? nine days after September 11 th , it was apparent that Central Asias primary relevance to U.S. security planning lay in its dual utility as a possible haven for terrorists and as a launching point
for anti-terrorist operations. 5 Reinforcing this notion was increased clarity on the limits of Caspian oil and gas. As the
1990s drew to a close, a critical mass of papers and articles were published questioning the
conventional wisdom about the regions energy stocks. 6 Few disputed that the Caspian Basin could be a significant source of gas and oil, but hopes that it would obviate global dependence on
the Persian Gulf abated. More realistic assessments of the Caspians reserves came into focus
and greater clarity was obtained on the difference between the regions proven reserves and potential output. According to U.S. government data, the whole of the Caspian Basin split among Azerbaijan,
Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and the far western corner of Uzbekistan might
collectively have potential oil reserves of 186 billion barrels, in addition to much smaller proven
reserves, the high-end estimate for which is only 32 billion barrels. The Caspians total output
(proven and potential) is roughly a third of the Gulfs proven reserves of 674 billion barrels, with
Persian Gulf fields possessing literally trillions of barrels more in unproven reserves. Looked
at another way, the collective potential and proven oil reserves of the Caspian are roughly
equivalent to three-quarters of the proven holdings of Saudi Arabia alone (264.2 billion barrels),
with the Kingdom still banking as much as 1 trillion barrels in potential reserves. In terms of gas,
the Caspian Basin weighs in at slightly more than one-quarter of the Gulfs proven reserves: the
five littoral states of the Caspian, plus western Uzbekistan, have potential and proven reserves
estimated at 560 trillion cubic feet (Tcf), as compared to the Gulfs proven holdings of 1,923 Tcf. 7 In short, the Caspian may be important, but it lacks the potential to alter the prominent role of
the Gulf states in oil and natural gas exports. 5 George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, September 20, 2001, the U.S. Capitol, Washington, DC, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.
6 See, for example, Geoffrey Kemp, The Persian Gulf Remains the Strategic Prize, Survival, vol. 40, no. 4, (Winter 1998-99), pp. 132-149; Martha Brill Olcott, The Caspians False Promise, Foreign Policy, no. 111 (Summer 1998), pp. 95-112; Amy Myers Jaffe and Robert Manning, The Myth of the Caspian Great Game: The Real Geopolitics of Energy, Survival, vol. 40, no. 4, (Winter 1998-99), pp. 112-131; and Amy Myers Jaffe, Unlocking the Assets: Energy and the Future of Central Asia and the Caucasus, (Rice University: James A. Baker, III Institute for Public Policy, April 1998), 26 pp.
7 Figures derived from United States Energy Information Administration (EIA) statistics, www.eia.doe.gov . See especially, Persian Gulf Energy Fact Sheet, April 2003, www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/pgulf.html, and Caspian Sea: Key Oil and Gas Statistics, August 2003, www.eia.doe.gov/
emeu/cabs/caspstats.html. Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? 8 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 9 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? Moreover, despite U.S. efforts to encourage Kazakh and even Turkmen participation in Western-
oriented pipelines (e.g., the Baku-Ceyhan route), most of the oil and gas from these two states
will continue to flow to Russia, other former Soviet states, and, to a lesser extent, Iran, or will
be consumed domestically. Both Tehran and Moscow will seek to purchase cheap Central Asian
energy for internal consumption allowing them to boost output of their own oil and gas to more
lucrative Western and Asian markets. Thus, the Caspians direct impact on global energy markets
may not even be as great as that of, say, Venezuela. 8 And, if estimates regarding its potential reserves prove to be overly ambitious, the Caspians impact could be much less. A Region unto Itself The response to the September 11 th attacks helped to promote a more clear differentiation between Central Asia and the Caucasus, but conceptually this trend is incomplete in the collective
mind of the U.S. government. Both the State Department and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) still lump the two together under a single deputy assistant secretary or office
director. In this regard, the military side of DoD has been out ahead, having altered its unified
command boundaries well in advance of September 11 th to transfer the Central Asian states (and Afghanistan) to the same area of responsibility (AOR) as the rest of the Greater Middle East under
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). In making this point, we do not mean to be overly critical of policy steps and organizational
structures adopted in the wake of the Soviet Unions collapse. The 1990s was a dizzying decade
in terms of the strategic shifts and realignments the world witnessed. Lumping the Caucasus
and Central Asia together was understandable at a time when the U.S. government was still
trying to address fully all the elements resulting from the collapse of the communist bloc and
the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It is easy to forget how shocking that period was for
geopolitics, and, to some extent, a conjoined approach to Central Asia and the Caucasus was
needed simply to get sufficient attention paid to these areas, when issues like NATO expansion
into Central and Eastern Europe and ongoing civil wars in the former Yugoslavia were dominating
policy agendas. 8 Ibid. Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? 8 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 9 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? The Silk Road Strategy Act, passed by Congress in 1999, deserves particular credit for helping
to focus U.S. efforts in both the Caucasus and Central Asia. 9 Our point here simply is that more than twelve years after the Soviet collapse greater specificity is needed in how we approach these
two regions. To this end, both State and OSD need to update their organizational structures to
reflect Central Asias linkages to its south and east and to leverage the Caucasus ties to Eastern
Europe and (especially in the case of Georgia) the Black Sea littoral. Dickering over the geographic divisions of Eurasia is not simply a picayune academic debate.
The nature of the conflicts and the security challenges in Central Asia and the Caucasus are
sufficiently different that they warrant delimitation as two separate regions. In large measure,
the South Caucasus is a region defined by ethnicity and ethnic conflict. The Abkhaz and Ossettian
separatist movements in Georgia and the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-
Karabakh are all rooted in ethnicity, with the latter conflict also having a religious dimension
as a clash between Orthodox Christians and Muslims. Likewise, the North Caucasus is heavily
influenced by ethnic divisions, which lie at the basis for Chechen claims of independence and
factor into tensions between Ossetians and Ingushetians as well. In contrast, though, Central Asia possesses a dizzying mix of ethnic groups to include
Karakalpaks, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Russians, Tartars, Tajiks, Turkmen, Uigurs, Ukrainians, and
Uzbeks, each of which are present in significant numbers but its overall level of ethnic tension
has been low, at least compared to other post-communist states. There have been occasional
riots and ethnic-inspired outbursts, but major bloodshed has not occurred at least on the basis
of ethnic clashes anywhere in the five former Soviet Central Asian states since they attained
independence. 10 Migration by ethnic Russians from Kazakhstan, coupled with increased birthrates among the
Kazakhs, is en route to eliminating slowly what once was seen as a principal flashpoint in Central
Asian security: fears that either northern Kazakhstan would be annexed by a reinvigorated and
revanchist Russia or that Kazakh suppression of ethnic Russian rights would force Russia to 9 Full text of the Silk Road Strategy Act is available at www.eurasianet.org/resource/regional/silkroad.html.
10 The 1989 clashes between Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks in the Fergana Valley are cited by some sources as evidence of the regions potential
for ethnic conflict. However, the majority of the Meskhetian Turks who were natives of the Caucasus forcibly resettled by Stalin in the Fergana
at the end of World War II have re-immigrated back to their native lands in Georgia, reducing, for the most part, the potential for this group to
serve as a primary source of ethnic tension. Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? 10 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 11 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? intervene for the protection of its
diaspora. In truth, Russian rhetoric
never reached the same fever pitch
over northern Kazakhstan as it
did over alleged abuses against
the Russophone communities in the politically more sensitive
Baltic states, especially Estonia
and Latvia. This was despite the
fact that Kazakhstan implemented
laws limiting the use of Russian in
offi cial business that were much
stricter than more controversial
legislation passed in Estonia and Latvia. Ultimately, though, the decision by many ethnic Russians to depart Kazakhstan is driven
as much, if not more, by limited economic prospects than by restrictions on language; that
said, there is a growing linkage in Kazakhstan between knowledge of the native language and
employment opportunities. 11 The absence of any widespread violence against the Slavic ethnic groups in the region, and especially in Kazakhstan, is one of the few success stories post-Soviet
Central Asia can boast. The other ethnic divide principally cited is the Uzbek-Tajik-Kyrgyz cleavage, which is
geographically concentrated in the Fergana Valley. In Central Asia, as in other parts of the USSR,
Soviet leaders split ethnic groups across republican borders to prevent nationalist movements
from coalescing into full-blown secessionist movements. There was a deliberate effort to ensure
that ethnic groups were never entirely concentrated in their eponymous republic. In the case of
the Central Asian Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs), this resulted in a bizarre gerrymandering
of the Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Tajik borders to create a cross-cutting spiral among the three states
frontiers in the densely populated Fergana Valley. Signifi cant Uzbek and Tajik populations were
cut off from their eponymous republic either by assignment to Kyrgyz administration directly 11 For an excellent discussion of the status of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan and efforts by the Kazakh leadership to develop a cohesive state,
see Martha Brill Olcott, Kazakhstan: Unfulfi lled Promise, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2002), pp. 51-86. Fergana Valley Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? 10 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 11 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? or through the creation of non-contiguous enclaves of Uzbek and Tajik territory inside Kyrgyz
frontiers. Uzbekistan inherited two such enclaves inside Kyrgyzstan, while Tajikistan has one, in
addition to a separate enclave inside Uzbek territory. A large Uzbek population around the city
of Khujand (i.e., the Leninabad oblast) was also grafted onto western Tajikistan while the Uzbek
SSR was assigned the cities of Bukhara and Samarqand, essential sites in the history of Tajik
culture and an area in which Tajiks constitute the majority population. 12 Further muddying the waters, the Fergana is an agriculturally rich area and the most densely
populated of Central Asia. Each of the three states has important economic stakes in the valley.
In addition to being home to an essential water supply, the Fergana encompasses a quarter of
Uzbekistans cotton production, half of Kyrgyzstans total agricultural and industrial output,
and three-quarters of Tajikistans arable land. 13 This combination of ethnic diversity, haphazard frontiers, and economic importance resulted in the identification of the Fergana Valley early on
in the post-Soviet era as a looming security imperative. Still, it is wrong to view the future of Central Asia through the lens of the type of ethnic violence
that has beset the Balkans or the Caucasus. Turkestan the historical region encompassing the
five modern Central Asian states was home to an array of ethnic groups throughout history,
many of whom were assimilated and folded into one another during the constant migrations
characteristic of the regions traditional nomadic lifestyle. Multi-ethnicity is far from a foreign
concept in this region and the overall benign treatment of Slavs resident in the region reinforces
this to large degree. Of the five eponymous ethnic groups in Central Asia, four have common
Turkic roots, with the Persian Tajiks being the odd man out, ethnically and linguistically.
Ethnicity is thus a difficult concept to parse in the Central Asian context. For example, the
ethnic distinction between Kyrgyz and Kazakhs is particularly dubious: they are essentially the
same people with the former having become associated with the mountains while the latter took
to the steppes. This highlights an essential characteristic of determining loyalties in Central Asia: regionalism
is of far greater importance in terms of assessing group affiliation than ethnicity on its own. It 12 For an extended discussion of ethnic groups and potential tensions in the Fergana, see Kenneth Weisbrode, Central Eurasia: Prize or Quicksand? Adelphi Paper 338, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001), pp. 45-62.
13 Ibid., p. 47. Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? 12 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 13 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? is instructive, in this regard, to consider that the principal hot conflict in the post-Soviet era
the Tajik civil war was largely fought among contending regional factions within Tajikistan.
Of the multiple factions involved in the conflict, only one the ethnic Uzbeks from Khujand
had an ethnic distinction, but it was not a motivating factor in their involvement in the conflict.
Few assign the Tajik civil war status as an ethnic conflict and it is best viewed both as a power-
struggle between Islamist and secular forces and more generally as an internal struggle among
disparate geographic groups, jockeying for power and spoils in the wake of the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Participation by Russian forces in the conflict was not ethnically motivated (e.g.,
there was no widespread anti-Slav oppression), with Russian support for the ex-communist
Khulyabi faction primarily rooted in a desire to ensure a continuation of existing Russian political
and strategic influence in Tajikistan. 14 Likewise, personal connections and clanism also supersede pure ethnicity as a defining feature in
group identity and in the formation of alliances. This is especially the case in the two largest and
most influential of the Central Asian states. Internal politics and group identity in Kazakhstan
are heavily influenced by affiliation with zhuzes, or hordes, specifically, the Great Horde, the Middle Horde, and the Small Horde. Holdovers from Kazakhstans nomadic past, affiliation
with the zhuzes reinforces regional distinctions as well. Each of the hordes is proximate with a different area of Kazakhstan: the Great Horde being centered in the south, the Middle Horde in
the north, and the Small Horde in the west and central regions. 15 The hordes, in turn, possess numerous sub-divisions, consisting of tribes and clans, with the Great Horde of the south having
been the source of power in the Kazakh SSR and up through the countrys independence. It is
this zhuz to which President Nursultan Nazarbayev belongs. Intermarriage among clans is not uncommon and the Kazakh ruling elite is hardly exclusive in terms of membership in the Great
Horde. 16 But it is important to recognize that zhuz and clan affiliation, along with the attendant regional linkages, are an extra and important layer in Kazakhstans internal dynamics one that
arguably surpasses ethnicity as a delimiting factor throughout much of Central Asia. While Uzbekistan lacks the unique zhuz structure, regional-based clans are important internal sorting devices and are much more relevant than ethnicity. The major clans based 14 The Khujandis and the Khulyabis had traditionally shared power as the dominant regional groups in the Tajik SSR. After the Soviet collapse,
the Khujandis sought to jettison their partners and dominate the other regional factions.
15 Olcott, Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise, p. 173. 16 Ibid., pp. 183-188. Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? 12 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 13 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? geographically around Samarqand, Tashkent, and Fergana dominate discussions of internal
politics in Uzbekistan. President Islam Karimov, a native of Samarqand, has successfully built
a large constituency among the Tashkent clan, referred to as his Tashkent mafia, while also
maintaining strong ties to his traditional base in Samarqand. His personal political history is
one of straddling these two clans, usually at the expense of Fergana and other lesser clans,
such as those based in the southern provinces of Surkhandarya and Qashqadarya. Karimov will
extend or withhold influence and spoils to subordinates from either Tashkent or Samarqand in
accordance with his tactical needs in terms of maintaining and consolidating his own personal
power. Interestingly though, when Uzbeks discuss the clan structure, they never assign it an
ethnic dimension (as they could, given the high concentration of Tajiks in Samarqand and the
surrounding area.) Rather, Uzbeks posit the discussion in terms of the Tashkent clan and the
Samarqand clan, and avoid any ethnic modifiers whatsoever. 17 The 1990 street clashes between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in the Fergana cities of Osh and Uzen
underscore that ethnic violence is not impossible in this region. 18 Still, were one of the Central Asian states to collapse or suddenly shed its autocratic leadership, widespread ethnic violence
would be far less likely than score-settling along clan and regional lines. As the United States
developed its policy, and possibly military responses, in such a scenario, it would be incorrect
to overly fixate on ethnicity as the primary faultline for instability. The United States, has to
an extent, already made this mistake in neighboring Afghanistan, where it would have been
better served concentrating on efforts by a regional grouping (i.e., the Panjsheri Valley-based
Northern Alliance) to monopolize power in the post-Taliban government, as opposed to fixating
on questions of ethnic balance. Ethnicity certainly cannot be overlooked in this part of the world,
but we need to readjust our mindset to equate similar and possibly greater value to regionalism,
clanism, and other personal connections. Greater fidelity on the specific interdynamics within
Central Asias principal clans, tribes, and personal mafias therefore will be a primary intelligence
priority if the United States is to devise and implement an effective strategy for Central Asia in
the years ahead. 17 IFPA background interviews, Tashkent, June 2003. Recently, there are indications that Samarqand has returned to favor in Karimovs inner
circle after a period of ascendancy by the Tashkent clan, as seen in the reassignment of important responsibilities to Karimovs long-time adviser,
Ismoil Jorabekoev, who also is one of the principal leaders of the Samarqand clan.
18 Approximately 200 were killed in the 1990 riots in Osh and Uzen. See Wiesbrode, p. 47. Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? 14 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 15 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Assessment The global war on terror (GWOT) drives increased specification in the U.S. approach at the
regional and sub-regional levels. The U.S. government is, for example, slowly but increasingly
breaking out Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia from the general rubric of East Asia, in large
measure due to the relevance of some Southeast Asian states to terror-related concerns. To a
lesser extent, sub-Saharan Africa is also viewed in a more distinct light because of the growing
concerns related to this regions potential as a sanctuary for terrorist networks and leaders, to
say nothing of its potential as a recruiting ground for extremist organizations. 19 A distinct approach towards Central Asia should be part of this trend, and the artificial linkage
between Central Asia and the Caucasus needs to be jettisoned once and for all from organizational
structures and planning documents. So, too, the de-emphasis of the Caspian as the primary focus
of engagement with both the Caucasus and Central Asia is a trend that should continue. Indeed,
to the extent that energy issues enter into debates over policy options with respect to either side
of the Caspian, it should be in the context of discussions as to how energy wealth can be used to
stabilize the weak states along the Caspian littoral and inhibit the declines in living standards
that provide fertile recruiting grounds for radical Islam and other extremist ideologies. Separating Central Asia from the more European Caucasus and thinking of it as its own region,
with its own set of challenges, would assist in crafting a sounder, more tailored approach to this
difficult but critical region. We need to understand both the advantages inherent in Central Asia
and the unique shortcomings and weaknesses endemic to this part of the world. For example,
while the absence of overpowering ethnic rivalries is one of Central Asias strengths, the absence
of the type of civil society seen in Eastern Europe, to include the Caucasus, is one of Central
Asias fundamental weaknesses, as will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter. 19 Though some parts of the U.S. government have recognized sub-Saharan Africas growing importance to the GWOT, it is still not clearly
understood in all quarters. Moreover, there remains perhaps a lack of understanding on the potential for Africa to be a new and prominent
breeding ground for anti-American and Islamic extremist movements and not simply an alternate source of terrorist infrastructure. See Princeton
N. Lyman and J. Stephen Morrison, The Terrorist Threat in Africa, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2004, vol. 83, no. 1, pp. 75-86. Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? 14 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 15 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Giving Central Asia its due as a discrete, defi ned region unto itself is, of course, only the fi rst step
towards formulating the basis for a long-term strategy of U.S. involvement in Asias heartland.
Clarity is also needed on the specifi c characteristics of the ensemble countries that make up the
whole. That said, as the individual characteristics of these countries are better understood, it
becomes obvious that policy in this region will come down to selecting the best from among bad
options as the United States decides on long-term partnerships. Weak States, Corrupt Regimes Perhaps the most telling fact about the governments of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan
is that the president today is the same man who was leader of the SSR Communist Party at the
time of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Unlike the Baltic states or even Ukraine, the Central
Asian republics were hardly engines of change in undermining the Soviet regime. Kazakhstans
Nazarbayev was, in fact, one of the leading proponents of the so-called All Union Treaty, which
was designed to retain the basic unity of the Soviet state while allowing for marginally more
autonomy at the republic level. The Central Asian states did not seize independence so much as
they found themselves independent by default. The absence of signifi cant grassroots involvement
in securing that independence with the Baltic experience and the Rukh movement in Ukraine again the models by which the other republics must be judged resulted in limited movement
towards democratic reforms or establishment of a pluralistic government once Soviet control had
been removed in Central Asia. Chapter III: Partnership with Stalins Heirs Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? 16 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 17 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? This is not to say that no national independence movements existed in Central Asia. In
Uzbekistan, in particular, two notable movements Birlik (Unity) and Erk (Freedom) emerged in the late 1980s. 20 However, these and other political forces were assiduously suppressed by the communist apparatus or, in some cases, fractured along internal lines, as independence
was attained. Moreover, these groups were never allowed the internal freedom that opposition
movements in Central and Eastern Europe enjoyed. Nor, for that matter, did the Central Asian
states benefit from active diasporas in the United States or Western Europe, as many of the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe did. The limited ability of internal independence movements to affect circumstances, in turn, resulted
in them being, more or less, observers to their countries attaining independence, rather than
revolutionary forces. This deprived these movements of the type of legitimacy and influence seen
in national independence movements in the Baltic states and in the communist states of Central
Europe. In short, Central Asia never truly had the opportunity to develop its own Solidarity or
Sajudis. In turn, the organization of effective political opposition movements to counter-balance
the former communists in a multi-party system never came to pass on a lasting basis. Kazakhstan and especially Kyrgyzstan did experience initial experiments with somewhat genuine
multi-party systems in the early and mid-1990s before succumbing to complete presidential rule
later in that decade, but Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan shifted almost directly into authoritarian
control, while Tajikistan descended immediately into the throes of a civil war. Today, human
rights abuses continue and efforts to develop democracy have been retarded by the Soviet-era
legacy and the efforts of Central Asias autocratic rulers. Of the five, only Kyrgyzstan narrowly ranks as partially free in Freedom Houses most recent
Annual Survey of Freedom. Turkmenistan achieved the lowest score possible, with Uzbekistan
not far behind; Kazakhstan and Tajikistan scored marginally better but still qualified firmly as
not free. 21 While placing numerical values on such intangible factors is always somewhat imprecise, the Freedom House ratings nonetheless underscore the limited political freedoms and 20 For more on these groups, see Uzbekistan at Ten: Repression and Instability, International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 21, August 21, 2001, pp. 4-6, available at www.intl-crisis-group.org.
21 Freedom House assigns each country a two value ranking which is in turn used to determine level of freedom. The first score ranks civil
liberties on the basis of one (best) to seven (worst). The second figure uses the same criteria for political rights. The specific scores are:
Kazakhstan (6,5), Kyrgyzstan (5,5), Tajikistan (6,6), Turkmenistan (7,7), and Uzbekistan (7,6). By comparison, the United States score was
(1,1). For full scores and an explanation of the ratings, see www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm. Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? 16 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 17 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? civil liberties available to the people of Central Asia. They also accurately point out the rough
hierarchy of the various autocracies in the region. Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan is truly the most repressive of the five. It has emerged as a bizarre quasi-theocracy devoted to President Saparmurat Niyazovs twisted cult of
personality. 22 From rechristening himself, Turkmenbashi or Father of all Turkmens to renaming the months of the year after members of his family, Niyazov has pursued a steady
and deliberate path to subordinate all elements of Turkmenistan to his own persona. This
has included the publication of Turkmenbashis epic, nearly mythic autobiography, a text
that is now required reading for all schoolchildren and which Niyazov himself has compared
in importance to the Koran. In the process, he has squelched all organized opposition, jailed
and brutalized would-be challengers, and monopolized local media. Niyazov has also excelled
at squandering Turkmenistans wealth on palaces and outrageous statues devoted to his
vainglory. 23 Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan runs a close second to Turkmenistan in terms of overall repression, but Karimov appears, frankly, much saner than Niyazov, and also less enamored with cult-of-
personality trappings than his Turkmen counterpart. 24 This is not to say that Karimov cannot evince arrogance or that he leaves any doubt as to his ultimate authority in Uzbekistan.
Tashkent doesnt lack for public images of Karimov and the media is firmly in his grip.
However, Karimov usually shows a strong pragmatic streak, at least in terms of dealing
with both international donor agencies and external powers. Many attribute to him a knack
for talking a good game with high-level dignitaries, regarding human rights and political
reform, even though inevitably there is no follow through on his progressive statements. 25 22 For an excellent snapshot of life under Niyazovs bizarre rule, see Ilan Greenberg, When a Kleptocratic, Megalomaniacal Dictator Goes Bad,
The New York Times, January 5, 2003, Section 6, p. 34, Lexis-Nexis.
23 An unfortunate argument can be made over which is the more ridiculous monument in Ashgabat: the giant bull cradling a globe between its
horns, topped by a golden infant Niyazov embracing the world, or the over-sized statue of the adult Niyazov that rotates during the course of the
day to ensure that the sun is always shining on his face.
24 While its difficult to quantify, Tashkent doesnt have the feel of the type of totalitarian society Niyazov is purported to have built in
Ashgabat. That said, even to the casual visitor it is clear that Uzbekistan is run by a privileged, authoritarian elite.
25 Karimov is not infallible on this front, as his government miscalculated badly in its decision to host a major conference of the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in May 2003. Envisaged as a means of attracting foreign investment and showcasing renovations to
Tashkent, the forum turned into a series of open criticisms of the Uzbek regimes human rights record and dismal history of economic reform. See
Esmer Islamov, EBRD Meeting in Tashkent Turns into PR Disaster for Karimov, Eurasianet, May 6, 2003, www.eurasianet.org/departments/ rights/articles/eav050603.shtml. Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? 18 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 19 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? Formal opposition at least among secular political forces is minimal and Islamic opposition
is persecuted with a violent zeal. Tajikistan. Tajikistan is a curious case in that it has what passes for a nominally functional multi-party system, including participation by the only legal Islamist party in Central Asia,
the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP). The peace settlement implemented in 2000 involved a
power-sharing arrangement with the majority of key positions going to President Emomali
Rahmonov and his Peoples Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT), but with representation
from the other contending factions, which united under the loose umbrella of the United
Tajik Opposition (UTO) during the war. Rahmonov has since consolidated his power and
the government remains heavily infused with PDPT members (many from Khulyab), though
elements of the UTO (including the IRP) are involved. This veneer of pluralism is undermined
by the tenuous truce that maintains peace in the country and steady efforts by Rahmonov
to ensconce his authority. 26 Moreover, Rahmonovs ruling party has occasionally employed the power ministries against its political rivals as seen recently in the arrest of the IRPs
Deputy Chairman Shamsiddin Shamsiddinov and there are indications that Rahmonov may
be rethinking his tolerance of the IRP altogether. 27 Working against the Tajik president, though, is the poor communications and transportation
infrastructure that leaves large portions of the Tajik population literally disconnected. The
severe mountainous terrain abetted the regionalism and factionalism that fed the civil war. It
also limits the central authority of the government. As a result, Rahmonov is unable to wield
the absolute control over his country that Karimov or Niyazov does and therefore has to both
tolerate and bargain with opposition elements at the regional level. Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan presents an extremely mixed bag: on the one hand, it has the basis for the most viable political opposition of any of the former Soviet Central Asian states: a
small cadre of (for lack of a better term) baby oligarchs who quickly amassed riches during
the privatization process of the early 1990s. Under the rubric of the Democratic Choice of
Kazakhstan (DCK), these new business elites have pressed for greater political normalcy and 26 For example, in the summer of 2003, Rahmonov engineered a successful national referendum that essentially allows him to seek re-election
through 2020.
27 Kambiz Arman, Opposition in Tajikistan Lies Low after High-Profile Arrest, Eurasianet, November 12, 2003, www.eurasianet.org/ departments/rights/articles/eav111203.shtml. Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? 18 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 19 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? a counter-balance to Nazarbayevs presidential rule; more to the point, they seek a functional
and independent legal structure to protect their wealth over the long term. 28 Having made their money through questionable deals and practices, the oligarchs of Kazakhstan now seek
to go legitimate in a system that will sustain and protect their rights. (Comparisons to the
situation in Russia during the late 1990s leap easily to mind.) The bad news is that the formation of the DCK has pushed Nazarbayev into more aggressive
behavior vis-à-vis his domestic political opponents and dampened hopes that the Kazakh
leader might truly be more progressive in the long run than his more openly dictatorial
brethren in Ashgabat and Tashkent. The Kazakh president has conducted a mini-purge
of DCK supporters (and perceived supporters) from his inner circle and from key posts in
government and industry; the DCKs leader, Galymzhan Zhakiyanov, was arrested on all-
purpose corruption charges in April of 2002 and remains imprisoned. As well, attacks
against opposition media and independent journalists have been reinvigorated, with the
apparent framing of outspoken journalist Sergei Duvanov on rape charges among the most
notable of recent attacks against the press. 29 For the moment, the DCK has scaled back its rhetoric to avoid personal attacks on Nazarbayev
and to focus on the establishment of the rule of law. Despite set-backs and Nazarbayevs
backlash, the DCK or at least the sentiment it represents remains arguably the most
viable opposition force in Central Asia, among secular movements. Encouragingly, a second
likeminded movement, Ak Zhol (Bright Path), has also recently risen in prominence. With strong ties to Kazakhstans burgeoning middle class, it has taken pains to focus less on
personal opposition to Nazarbayev (as the DCK initially did) and more on the broad goal of
political liberalization and legal reform. 30 Kyrgyzstan. Once considered the most liberal of the Central Asian states, Kyrgyzstans democratic prospects have been in steady decline since 1996 and in outright crisis for the 28 For a detailed discussion of the DCK, see Aidar Kusainov, Kazakhstans Critical Choice, Eurasianet, January 13, 2003, www.eurasianet.org/ departments/rights/articles/eav011303.shtml.
29 Duvanov has written extensively on corruption among Kazakhstans ruling elite; his arrest came shortly before Duvanov was scheduled
to leave for a lecture tour of the United States. The circumstances of the case and his treatment under the Kazakh legal system have all been
questioned by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OCSE) and numerous foreign observers.
30 Aldar Kusainov, Kazakh Opposition Party Showing New Stridency, Eurasianet, November 13, 2003, www.eurasianet.org/departments/ insight/articles/eav111303a.shtml. Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? 20 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 21 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? better part of the past two years. Mountainous and fractured along northern and southern
regional lines, Kyrgyzstan has always seemed a likely candidate to fragment and repeat the
Tajik experience of civil war. President Askar Akaev has used the countrys perilous position
as a pretext for authoritarian action, including the assumption of presidential rule in the mid-
1990s and the effective subversion of what had been a highly functional parliament counter-
balancing his power. As his own family has become tied up in the operation and sale of state
industries, Akaevs personal position has become irrevocably intertwined with his political
office. Short of fleeing the country, he would have great difficulty in stepping down from his
post without facing jail or other reprisals. This has encouraged him to resort to strong-arm
tactics such as the jailing of his two principal political rivals Feliks Kulov and Azimbek
Beknazarov and repeated assaults on press freedoms. 31 Riots in the south of the county in March of 2002 (stemming from Beknazarovs arrest) resulted in the deaths of at least five
protesters at the hands of local police and brought to the fore new concerns that Kyrgyzstan
could yet succumb to widespread violence if political liberalization is not forthcoming from
the Akaev regime. 32 That Akaev and his inner circle have used his position for personal gain is hardly a novelty
in Central Asia. Kazakhstan is perhaps most notorious for this, given press coverage of
questionable efforts by U.S. and European oil companies to curry favor with Nazarbayev in order
to obtain lucrative stakes in the Kazakh portion of the Caspian. 33 But in truth, all five of the former Soviet Central Asian states are deeply corrupt regimes, with each president running his
own extensive personal patronage network (systems which, in turn, reinforce the importance
of clanism and regionalism). This has resulted in a growing chasm between haves and have
nots; while those closest to the Central Asian leaders have accumulated enormous wealth 31 There are three excellent reports available online that examine the decline of democracy in Kyrgyzstan and the development of various
factions that now oppose Akaevs rule. See Alisher Khamidov, Kyrgyzstan: Organized Opposition and Civil Unrest, Eurasianet, December 16, 2002, www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/eav121602.shtml, and Kyrgyzstan at Ten: Trouble in the Island of Democracy, International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 22, August 28, 2001, and Kyrgyzstans Political Crisis: An Exit Strategy, International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 37, August 20, 2002, both available at www.intl-crisis-group.org.
32 The backlash against the Beknazarov arrest eventually led to the early release of the popular parliamentarian, but with the controversial
stipulation that his conviction resulted in the forfeiture of his parliamentary seat.
33 After being taken on holiday to the Bahamas by Mobil, Nazarbayev reportedly demanded a private jet, a tennis court, and satellite equipment
for his daughters television network in order to facilitate Mobil obtaining a share in the Tengiz oilfield. Though Mobil asserts that it did not
acquiesce to his demands, the requests are illustrative of the mindset among Central Asian ruling elites. Moreover, there are reports that the
Kazakh regime skimmed as much as $200 million off the fee eventually paid by Mobil for a stake in Tengiz. See Seymour Hersh, The Price of Oil:
What was Mobil up to in Kazakhstan and Russia? The New Yorker, July 9, 2001, www.newyorker.com/archive/content/?030414fr_archive01. Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? 20 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 21 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? since the collapse of Soviet control, average Central Asians have seen their standard of living
decline in almost every manner imaginable. From basic sanitation to quality of health care,
the Central Asian states have experienced precipitous and worrisome regression over the past
decade. Infectious disease has returned to the region with a vengeance: outbreaks of hepatitis,
cholera, and even bubonic plague were all seen during the 1990s; as this study is being written,
Dushanbe is beset by a typhoid epidemic largely attributable to atrophy of the Tajik capitals
water system. 34 Perhaps most disturbing of all, literacy rates and the overall quality of education in Central Asia has declined steadily since 1991. 35 The people of Central Asia have suffered the societal breakdown and economic adversity seen
in many other post-communist countries, but with little prospect for improvement in the long
run. Unlike Central or Eastern Europe where belt-tightening and declines in service could
be rationalized as the temporary cost for better living standards and economic prosperity in
the future, Central Asians have no such expectations and their vision of the future is one of
little hope. Of the five states, only Kazakhstan can reasonably be assessed as having even
the potential for widely available economic opportunity in the mid term. It alone combines a
willingness to follow international advice on economic reform with the resource base (ample oil
and gas deposits) to fuel long-term growth. But political and legal reform will also have to be
forthcoming if Kazakhstans wealth is to not simply be the purview of a select few. While Kyrgyzstan has also listened to international advice and acted on it in some instances, the
country remains inherently poor, without access to any of the Caspians hydrocarbon resources.
Both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have turned their backs on economic reform almost entirely,
running closed, Stalinist economies in miniature. Each country does have substantial natural
resources to build on, though, if there ever were a willingness to implement market reforms and
genuine economic restructuring. Here, too, political reform would also be required, as well as a
great deal of time: both states would essentially be starting from 1989-levels (or worse) if they
were ever to truly attempt integration into the global economy. 34 John Bennet, Poor Drinking Water Seen as Source of Typhoid Outbreak in Tajik Capital, Eurasianet, October 24, 2003, www.eurasianet.org/ departments/environment/articles/eav102403.shtml.
35 See Jeremy Bransten, As World Marks Literacy Day, What of USSRs Legacy? RFE/RL Weekday Magazine, September 4, 2003, www.rferl.org/nca/features/2003/09/04092003185404.asp. Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? 22 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 23 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? Tajikistan still recovering from a decade of civil war and unrest has the dubious distinction
of being the poorest of all the former Soviet republics. 36 There is limited hope that privatization of state-owned industries and a prolonged period of stability will improve its economic
prospects somewhat. But overall, Tajikistan remains a hostage to its own harsh topography: the
mountainous terrain inhibits the establishment of the type of mass transit networks that large-
scale industry thrives on, while farming is impossible except in the Tajik portion of the Fergana
and a few other pockets of arable land. Moreover, like its Kyrgyz neighbor, Tajikistan cannot
look forward to any economic benefits from the Caspians energy reserves. The Weakness of Civil Society The poor standards of living, ubiquitous corruption, and limited political freedoms have yet to
translate into effective, broad-based opposition to the ruling regimes (at least among secular
forces). This again is, in part, a consequence of the extremely limited role that national movements
played in attaining independence for the Central Asian states and the subsequent failure to
develop viable alternative political parties to the presidential parties that morphed out of the old
Communist Party structures. It also, of course, is a result of the effective use of authoritarian
measures by regional governments, especially in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. But perhaps the
most important and intractable element at play in the lack of opposition is the absence of a clearly
defined sense of citizenship and statehood among the majority of Central Asians. None of the five Central Asian states has ever existed before as a distinct entity. The ethnic
groupings on which the SSRs were originally based have been around for centuries and have rich
histories and cultures, but they have no modern experience as discrete states with formalized
governing institutions. Identity for most Central Asians is related far more strongly to specific
regions, tribal linkages, and lastly, ethnicity, than it is to citizenship in independent states.
Though each of the regimes has tried to some extent to impose a national identity on the
people living within its borders, results have been decidedly mixed. No pervasive sense of
nationality exists nor is there overwhelming personal investment in or loyalty to the state. Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians living under Soviet rule still clung to their own conception
of themselves as members of occupied, distinct countries, just as Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, 36 Tajikistan, The World Fact Book 2003, (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2003) www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook. Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? 22 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 23 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? Hungarians, and others in Eastern Europe could look to the past for some period when their
people lived as an independent state or at least as a discrete political entity under a larger empire
(e.g., Austria-Hungary). Central Asians have no similar experience from which to benefit. The
regions nomadic lifestyle had little use for the type of Westphalian state-groupings commonplace
in Europe for the past four-hundred years. This certainly is not to say that Central Asians are
incapable of adapting to modern state structures, nor is it meant to endorse the faulty notion
that Central Asians or any other group are somehow mysteriously incapable of governing
themselves or creating functioning democracies. However, it is important to recognize that they
are starting from scratch in this regard, without the benefit of any good historical precedents or
models in the region. Compounding matters, to the extent that civil society exists in Central Asia, it is not geared
towards promoting the establishment of unified states. Civil society in the Baltics, Poland,
and elsewhere played a vital role in keeping national identity and other concepts essential
for statehood alive during the communist era. In Central Asia, civil society, for the most part,
reinforces loyalty and relationships to a region or a tribe; in short, civil society promotes
fragmentation. This is a powerful variable in the equation of Central Asias future as it not only
works against the establishment of viable states in the long run, but also prevents the coalescing
of effective national opposition movements in the near term. The United States has tried to encourage the development of stronger grassroots organizations
within Central Asia devoted to such issues as human rights and this is an important nascent step
in fostering a politically aware culture focused on national concerns. 37 However, such efforts will take time to bear fruit and in the extended interim it should come as no surprise if those
opposition leaders who do emerge come from within elite circles. The obvious drawback to such
figures is that it is uncertain how much of an alternative they can be expected to represent
in terms of reformist policies; many Central Asian opposition leaders come off much more as
personal rivals to the current dictator and less as champions of democracy. For instance, it has
long been rumored that prominent Kazakh exile and former Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin
enjoys close links to the Russian military-industrial complex and a background that includes 37 For example, Freedom House, which has been an essential tool in helping to develop grassroots human rights and democracy organizations
in Central and Eastern Europe, was in the first stages of setting up a human rights defense program in Uzbekistan during the summer of 2003,
with backing in part from the U.S. government. Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? 24 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 25 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? service in the KGB; this has prompted some observers to question whether he truly constitutes
a strong democratic alternative to Nazarbayev. 38 In Kyrgyzstan, jailed opposition leader Feliks Kulov once served as Akaevs Vice President and Minister for National Security and comes from
a Soviet police background. Given his past associations, there are similar doubts as to whether
he would turn out to be any more of a democrat than Akaev. 39 The business elites behind Kazakhstans DCK also offer a decidedly mixed bag: on the one hand,
they can hardly be categorized as humanitarian altruists; they are, by and large, robber barons
seeking to protect their wealth through the establishment of reliable and binding legal structures.
On the other, that money is a motivating factor in their case and that political reform is in their
best financial interests is one of the reasons that we credit them with having the best prospects
for success in the long run. While their motivation might not evoke comparisons to the Prague
Spring, their intentions to shift Kazakhstan towards a more functional, rule-of-law-based state
are in the broader interests of eventually attaining more popular participation in government
and greater respect for human rights. With no Central Asian Havels or Walesas on the horizon, political change is unlikely to come
about in a smooth, positive manner. At best, as in the Kazakh case, there may be incremental
change from corrupt dictatorship, to quasi-pluralism, with accepted and established legal norms
and limited respect for basic human rights and press freedoms. Even then, though, cronyism and
corruption will take still more time to eradicate completely. Many Central and Eastern European
states still struggle with the corruption hangover bequeathed to them by the communist era,
and those countries are literally light years ahead of the Central Asians in terms of establishing
lasting democratic, market-oriented states. Oligarchy might well be an interim step in the
political development of Central Asia and we should be prepared to accept that Russia under
Putin might be the best model we can hope for in terms of a democratic Central Asian state
in the near to mid term. Kazakhstan is, again, the state that we judge to have the best chance
for achieving something that approaches a semi-free society, with rule of law in place and a
reasonably viable economy. But that is far from a given at this point in time and much will depend
on how tenaciously Nazarbayev resists change. 38 Olcott, Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise, pp. 115, 161. 39 Khamidov, Kyrgyzstan: Organized Opposition and Civil Unrest. Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? 24 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 25 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? If Russia is the best example that can be hoped for in Kazakhstans case, Afghanistan provides
the obvious (if somewhat imperfect) example of a worst-case (but plausible) scenario for the
fate of the other four Central Asian states. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan both retain the potential
for fragmentation and civil strife similar to that seen in their neighbor to the south; the drug
trade also has the potential to overwhelm either state, but especially Tajikistan. Fragmentation
scenarios can also be posited in extreme worst cases for Uzbekistan (with its many regional
cleavages) and for Turkmenistan. Thus, while Kazakhstan and its Russian minority were
originally seen as the primary fragmentation danger in Central Asia (outside of Tajikistans civil
war), Kazakhstan now nominally represents the most stable state of the five countries to emerge
from Soviet Central Asia. The specific case of Turkmenistan highlights another inherent danger for Central Asian stability:
potential for rapid regime collapse and social disorder in the wake of a dictators death. With
the exception of Nazarbayev, who is purportedly grooming his daughter and her husband as
successors, none of the other four Central Asian leaders have designated heirs, nor is there
a coherent system in place for selecting one. Were one of them to die suddenly, succession
is unlikely to be smooth. Turkmenbashi is particularly troubling as, while he is only in his
early sixties, he has a number of heart and circulatory ailments. 40 Yet, none of his immediate family lives in the country with him and his obsessive paranoia has prevented anyone else from
obtaining stature within state structures, such as they exist. 41 Moreover, his obsession with structuring the state around his own cult of personality has compromised what little integrity
there was in state institutions inherited from the Soviet era; the only truly functioning elements
of the official apparatus are those devoted to his own personal safety and internal security.
Considering how tightly he holds the reigns of power, his sudden death a real prospect could
throw Turkmenistan into uncertain territory: either leaving it open to external meddling by a
neighboring power or turning the country immediately over into the hands of another, younger
despot, most likely culled from the security services. 40 The closeted nature of Turkmenistans regime often leads to exaggeration and rumors regarding the particulars of Turkmenbashis health.
But what is known is that Niyazov has had operations to remove blood clots, has undergone at least one bypass surgery, and continues to be under
the care of German cardiologists. See Zamira Eshanova, Rumors of Niyazovs Ill Health Symptomatic of a Closed Society, RFE/RL Weekday Magazine, October 11, 2002, www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/10/11102002154710.asp.
41 Rustem Safronov, Opposition in Exile: Turkmenistan, Eurasianet, December 9, 2002, p. 8, www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/ articles/eav120902.shtml. Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? 26 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 27 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? Hopes of the formation of an effective opposition to Niyazov have all but dwindled since the
arrest of former Turkmen Foreign Minister, Boris Shikmuradov, who defected from the regime
in November 2001 and took up residence in Moscow. At some point in the autumn of 2002,
Shikmuradov returned to Ashgabat and was subsequently detained for his alleged involvement
in an assassination attempt against Niyazov in November 2002. 42 Rumors persist that threats against Shikmuradovs family and associates were the motivating factor in bringing about his
forced return to the country in the face of obvious risks to his personal safety. Assessment As noted at the beginning of this chapter, there is an inverse relationship between degree of
clarity on the nature of the Central Asian regimes and optimism regarding U.S. policy choices. If
theres one constant in examining strategy towards Central Asia, it is that the United States will
have to choose repeatedly from the best of bad options. None of the five regimes qualifies as an
ideal partner or even a likeable one. Two leaders Kyrgyzstans Akaev and Tajikistans Rahmonov are challenged simply to
maintain control over their respective countries; neither is a stalwart of democracy. Niyazov in
Turkmenistan provides a rare opportunity to employ the word kook in the legitimate discourse
of international relations; as discussed above, he is also one bad day away from orphaning the
country he has bizarrely fashioned in his own image. Uzbekistans Karimov, our primary regional
partner since September 11 th , constitutes the most ruthless and effective of Central Asias tyrants; his security tactics and his stubborn refusal to pursue economic reform create ample
motivation for his citizens to at worst sign up with extremist groups, such as the IMU, and at best
to simply resent his regime and by extension U.S. financial and political support for it. Implicit in our discussion of the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan and Ak Zhol is the assessment that Kazakhstan may offer an attractive alternative to our current reliance on Uzbekistan as our
primary security partner in Central Asia. As already stated, Kazakhstan seems to have the best 42 Shikmuradovs predecessor as foreign minister, Avdi Kuliev, defected early during Niyazovs reign, seeking refuge in Moscow in 1992. While
in Russia, he established the Turkmenistan Foundation (www.erkin.net), which has been a prominent voice in criticizing the Niyazov regime.
Whether Kuliev maintains sufficient contacts and credibility inside Turkmenistan to lead a post-Niyazov government after a decade in exile is
uncertain; he attempted to return to Ashgabat in 1998 but was denied entry. For more on the Turkmen opposition, see Safronov, Opposition
in Exile: Turkmenistan, and Cracks in the Marble: Turkmenistans Failing Dictatorship, International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 44, January 17, 2003, available through www.icg.org. Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? 26 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 27 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? mix of political forces and economic resources to obtain a quasi-free state, even if the form it
takes some type of oligarchy will be far from a model democracy. But, here, as well, nothing is perfect. First, there is the basic question of whether Kazakhstan
would meet U.S. operational military requirements as well as the facilities in Uzbekistan. Second,
Nazarbayev has not yet been removed and shows every indication of willing to put up a fight
before surrendering his current level of comparative omnipotence. Even were he to go, he would
leave behind ample compatriots, all deeply corrupt, whose personal livelihoods are tied to the
exploitation of state resources. This could include some of those individuals leading the very
movements pushing for political reform and the establishment of the rule of law. If Nazarbayev
or any other of Central Asias dictators abdicated tomorrow, there would be a significant (and
dangerous) adjustment period during which economic, political, and legal norms would need to
be carefully built up and reinforced, less the country in question descend either into outright
chaos or succumb to a new dictator. Genuinely stable, functional, democratic states will be a long
time coming in Central Asia. And, in truth, the United States is limited in its ability to expedite the process. With the exception
of the movements among Kazakhstans business elites and burgeoning middle class, there is little
in the way of functional opposition for the United States to grab onto and support within the
region. The current U.S. emphasis is simply on cultivating grassroots civil society in states such
as Uzbekistan; this belies just how far away we are from having viable, nationally oriented political
movements to work with in opposition to the current regime in most Central Asian states. Kazakhstan may or may not be an optimum location for U.S. forces, but it does represent an
alternative to principal reliance on Uzbekistan and points out that the United States has options
beyond those embraced for expediency in the immediate aftermath of September 11 th . A strong case can be made that diversifying U.S. presence among other Central Asian states could increase
U.S. flexibility (operationally and diplomatically) while affording greater leverage to encourage
constructive changes by regimes such as Karimovs. 29 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 29 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Speaking at Georgetown University in October 2003, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul
Wolfowitz gave one of the fi rst explicit addresses related to the war of ideas, a concept
that had been circulating within Bush administration circles since its initial response to the
September 11 th attacks. Alternately referred to as the battle of ideas, the concept is fairly straight forward: kinetic combat operations are not enough to defeat terrorism. We also must win
the hearts and minds of those who would support terrorist members and groups and ultimately
we must fi nd a way to decrease the attractiveness of terrorism to future generations. We must
use the attractiveness of our ideas to help drain the ideological swamp in which extremism
breeds. While an element of this entails efforts to encourage positive changes and actions by
governments, as the Deputy Secretary described it, the battle of ideas must also incorporate a
direct approach to people the world over. [P]art of our outreach must go beyond governments, good ones as well as bad, to individuals, for
they are the real focal point of liberal democracy and the true engines of change. Accordingly, we
must become more attentive to the moderate voices in the Muslim world. For the better we are at
encouraging them, the more effective we can be, as the President has said, in leading the world
toward those values that will bring lasting peace. 43 In many ways, the battle of ideas concept has redefi ned how human rights and related issues
are thought about in strategic discussions. During the Cold War, human rights concerns generally
took a backseat to the idealogical struggle between East and West. The effort to win hearts and 43 Paul Wolfowitz, Winning the Battle of Ideas: Another Front in the War on Terror, Georgetown Iden Lecture, Georgetown University Walsh School of Foreign Service, Washington, DC, October 30, 2003, www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2003/sp20031030-depsecdef0642.html. Chapter IV: Central Asia as a Front in the War of Ideas Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? 30 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 31 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? minds in the war against terrorism have recast the strategic importance of human rights and
civil liberties. If it is to win over those populations on which extremism preys, the United States
needs to reassess its readiness to subsume human rights and other socio-political welfare issues
to advance its more immediate tactical concerns. Defense of human rights and promotion of
functional, democratic governments should, in the context of the GWOT, be readily regarded as
a core realist principal, matching in priority our evident need to combat terrorists with force.
These two tenets i.e. embracing the war of ideas and legitimizing the use of force to rid us of
terrorists threats should be regarded as two sides of the same coin as we devise our counter-
terrorism strategies. As the administration continues its pursuit of the GWOT, this concept will
be afforded increased priority, as Secretary of Defense Donal Rumsferls leaked Thoughts on
Terror makes plain, and already there are signs of stepped up public diplomacy efforts towards
the Middle East. Yet, there has not been, to date, a significant effort to craft a targeted war of
ideas approach to Central Asia. And, U.S. partnership with some questionable regimes in the
region leaves it awkwardly positioned to do so. However, the United States neglects this aspect
of strategy towards Central Asia at its own peril. This becomes even more obvious upon closer
examination of the specific nature of Islamic extremist forces at work in Central Asia. Islamic Extremism and Anti-Americanism in Central Asia Regrettably, fundamentalist Islam is the one element of civil society in Central Asia that has
thrived since the collapse of the Soviet Union. A range of movements from the non-violent Hizb
ut-Tahrir al-Islami (HTI) to the Taliban-allied IMU have taken hold in Central Asia over the
past ten years. 44 Today, their activities are primarily focused against the Karimov regime, with the important exception of the shadowy Eastern Islamic Turkestan Movement (ETIM), which
seeks the liberation of Xinjiang from Chinese control. 45 That the preponderance of extremist forces are allied against Karimov evokes, from the U.S. perspective, memories of pre-1979 Iran; 44 By far the best reference on the modern history of militant Islam in Central Asia is Ahmed Rashids Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2002), 281 pp. Chapters five through eight are an invaluable starting point for
anyone hoping to better understand groups such as the IRP, the HTI, and the IMU.
45 Frankly, little is known about this movement other than its objective of liberating Xinjiang from Chinese control. ETIM has committed only one
major act of terror in Central Asia the bombing of a group of Chinese migrant workers in Kyrgyzstan so its signature is still being assessed
and clues to its ultimate scope and capabilities remain unclear. (See Tamara Makarenko, Foreign Bases Complicate Terror Assessments in
Central Asia, Janes Intelligence Review, June 2003, p. 33) A central question is the extent to which ETIM has connections to Al Qaeda (as China has claimed) and other anti-Western Islamic movements based throughout Central and South Asia. ETIMs leader, Hasan Mahsum, was killed
in Pakistan by Pakistani security forces in December 2003, raising the prospect that there might, in fact, have been stronger linkages between
ETIM and the other extremist Islamic groups in the region, than once thought. Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? 30 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 31 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? we are in the uncomfortably familiar situation of having our principal military ally in a Muslim
region being a corrupt, secular authoritarian opposed by Islamic fundamentalist forces. On the surface, the IMU and the HTI could not be more different. The IMU is in actuality a
guerrilla movement, with strong rural roots, co-founded by two Uzbek veterans of the Tajik civil
war, Tohir Yuldeshev and Djuma Namangani. It is dedicated to the explicit overthrow of Karimov
and the liberation of Uzbekistan and the broader Fergana Valley. The HTI, in contrast, is a
much more intellectual, religious movement imported into the region in the mid-1990s; the HTI
originated in Jordan in the early 1950s and since has established a public network throughout
the Middle East and in parts of Europe, including in the United Kingdom, Denmark, and the
Netherlands. In less than a decade, it has achieved a robust presence on the ground in Central
Asia, with its membership generally estimated near 10,000, mostly in Uzbekistan, but also in
Tajikistan and southern Kyrgyzstan. 46 Unlike the IMU, Hizb ut-Tahrir has taken hold primarily among urban elites and espouses to achieve its goals through strictly non-violent means; there is
no overwhelming evidence that the movement has eschewed this principle as yet. The HTIs primary objective is somewhat nebulous: establishing an Islamic caliphate in Central
Asia as a prelude to the founding of a sharia-based society on a regional and eventually global scale. How exactly the caliphate is to be attained without violence is never spelled out explicitly
in any of the HTI literature; rather, establishment of the caliphate appears to be premised
somewhat naively on an impending, spontaneous moment when righteous Islamist forces will
simply be empowered to establish a true Islamic state, from which Islams influence will spread
to the rest of the region and eventually the world. 47 Implicit in the HTIs objective, of course, is that Karimov (and the other secular leaders of Central Asia) must eventually be removed. The
Uzbek president hasnt failed to notice this: HTI members and supporters are the most frequent
targets of his security forces. Not only are they resident in Uzbekistan (unlike the IMU which
has operated from bases in both Afghanistan and Tajikistan), but they are often easy targets,
particularly the lower-level members who distribute publications and other propaganda. Rounding 46 It is worth noting that the HTI seems to be expanding the basis of its traditional activities (e.g., leaflet and other propaganda distribution) in
Central Asia beyond its established operating areas of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and southern Kyrgyzstan. The movements influence is now being
felt in northern Kyrgyzstan and even Kazakhstan, which heretofore had avoided the presence of a major Islamic movement on its territory.
47 The HTI actually has an extensive and well-designed web-site (available in seven languages no less) that details the movements history and
goals and offers an extensive on-line library of publications on specific topics. See www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org. Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? 32 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 33 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? up HTI members and either torturing or executing them is a common occurrence, with a special
prison for Islamists having been constructed at Jaslik, in Uzbekistans western desert. 48 Differences aside, the HTI and the IMU are uniquely bound in that the persecution of the former
was one of the motivating factors for the formation of the latter. With the Karimov government
stepping up its repression of all manner of Islamist groups in Uzbekistan but especially Hizb
ut-Tahrir Namangani and Yuldeshev decided to put their collective experience during the Tajik
civil war to use on behalf of their own countrymen. In 1998, they officially formed the IMU,
declared jihad against the Karimov regime, and launched a series of daring and highly successful
raids onto Uzbek territory (via Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) in the summers of 1999 and 2000. Illustrating the deeply incestuous nature of Islamic fundamentalist groups operating in Central
Asia, the IMU emerged from its IRP lineage to receive sanctuary from the Taliban and also
allegedly benefited from strategic advice and funding provided by Osama bin Ladens Al Qaeda
network. Yuldeshev took on the role of the IMUs political and spiritual chief, while Namangani
became both the military head of the movement and its most charismatic leader. A former sergeant in the Soviet paratroops who had fought against the mujahadeen in the
waning days of the Soviet campaign in Afghanistan, Namangani later became a legendary field
commander for the IRP during the Tajik civil war. He settled for a time in Tajikistan after the
cease fire in 1997 and subsequently set up a training facility and base in Tajikistans Tavildara
Valley. He also reportedly became heavily involved in the heroin trade at this time to raise funds
and soon attained status as a cult hero for both his battlefield prowess and generosity to his
fighters and their families. 49 Namanganis death at the hands of U.S. airstrikes during Operation Enduring Freedom is perhaps one of the greatest unheralded successes of the war against terror. 50 Aside from his 48 Since its construction in 1997, the prison/labor camp at Jaslik has earned a place of special infamy within the human rights community and
has unofficially been dubbed the place from which no one returns by Uzbeks. Abuses of Islamists at Jaslik were among the findings of a stinging
evaluation of the Karimov regimes human rights record cited in The U.S. State Departments 2000 Human Rights Report for Uzbekistan, www.humanrights-usa.net/reports/uzbekistan.html. Subsequent statements by the Department of State have suggested that Uzbekistan is
making progress on human rights issues, including with respect to the use of torture. Independent human rights watchdogs, however, tend to
dismiss the improvements cited by the State Department as isolated attempts by the Karimov regime to curry good will, while suppression of
human rights and practices such as torture remain systematic. See Human Rights Watch, Uzbekistan: Progress on Paper Analysis of the U.S. State Departments Certification of Uzbekistan, June 3, 2003, hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/uzbek060303-bck.htm.
49 Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, pp. 144-145. 50 Namangani is believed to have been killed late in November 2001, near Kunduz, Afghanistan, where he was leading a group of foreign fighters
on behalf of the Taliban. Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? 32 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 33 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here? tactical brilliance, Namangani appeared to be a once-in-a-generation leader who had attained,
as Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid describes it, an almost Che Guevara-like aura in the eyes
of the people of the Fergana and southern Uzbekistan. 51 Had he lived, his status and influence would have been a formidable boon to the Islamic cause in Central Asia. However, the inability
of U.S. intelligence to produce Namanganis body coupled with subsequent retractions by the
United States about the death of Chemical Ali during Operation Iraqi Freedom have left some Uzbek officials wary that the IMU leader may yet still be alive. 52 Overall, most Western analysts assert that Enduring Freedom broke the back of the IMU. 53 Privately, senior Uzbek officials are less sanguine, noting that while the U.S. intervention in
Afghanistan certainly depleted the IMUs infrastructure and destroyed its weapons stocks, they
remain unconvinced that the movement is defeated, pointing out that a number of IMU fighters
remain at large in both northern Pakistan and southern Afghanistan. 54 Moreover, while (in their eyes) Namanganis fate is uncertain, Tohir Yuldeshev is still definitely at large, having escaped
from Tora Bora during Operation Anaconda in March 2002. 55 Uzbek officials posit that Yuldeshev is merely regrouping his fighters in the Afghan-Pakistan border region and that the IMU remains
a real danger to Uzbekistans security. For its part, the HTI, while clearly persecuted to an unnecessary degree by Karimov, is far from
benign. Hizb ut-Tahrirs proclamations of non-violence notwithstanding, its primary goal no
matter how pie-in-the-sky sounding ultimately would result in the overthrow of the currently
established state structures in Central Asia and the establishment of an Islamic fundamentalist
regime. To put it mildly, this would not be in the United States